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During the past two decades, improvements in agricultural productivity have 
been largely based on the introduction of a technology package that includes 
high-yielding plant varieties, intensive use of chemical fertilizers, herbicides 
and pesticides, and an abundant supply of water. Despite undeniable success 
in raising productivity, concerns exist about the environmental sustainability 
of this model. Use of large amounts of agrochemicals has caused severe soil 
and water pollution, and the development of strains resistant to pesticides. 
Water resources are becoming increasingly scarce. Moreover, the genetic base 
of important high-yielding varieties is increasingly uniform and, as a con-
sequence, they are susceptible to unpredictable outbreaks of disease and to 
the harmful effects of plant pests. Thus far, however, relatively few farmers 
in developing countries have had access to this new technology and capital- 
intensive methods of production.
Nonetheless, the emerging biotechnology revolution is stimulating hope 
that it will provide the basis for more sustainable agriculture in developing 
countries. This is because biotechnology today is different from previous 
agricultural technologies in two ways. First, biotechnology can enhance 
product quality by improving the characteristics of plants and animals.
Second, biotechnology may potentially conserve natural resources and improve 
environmental quality by using organisms for degradation of toxic chemicals 
and wastes, fertilizers and soil improvement, and the development of insect- 
and disease-resistant plant varieties. Many of these applications are, or will 
soon be, a reality, and they can have far reaching consequences for the solution 
of important problems of developing countries. It is paradoxical, however, that 
although developing countries are perhaps the main beneficiaries of agricultural 
biotechnology, its development is almost exclusively concentrated in highly 
industrialized countries. That is not surprising in light of the high-level 
scientific research and the capital it embodies (Solleiro 1995). Moreover, 
innovation is increasingly controlled by large multinational companies.
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In these conditions, it can be expected that the adoption of new biotechnolo-
gies by the developing economies will be concentrated in sectors of greatest 
economic development potential, will increase internal social differences, and 
will bring greater poverty to small producers and hired personnel.
Faced with this perspective, the only way to confront the above risks 
while taking advantage of existing opportunities will be by having a greater 
control over biotechnology in developing countries. That will depend to a 
great extent on the level of scientific and technological knowledge already 
attained in this area. But developing countries must not believe that they will 
be able to go “shopping” to the technology supermarkets of the industrialized 
countries (Deo 1991). On the contrary, given the barriers erected against the 
transfer of biotechnology, Third World countries will have to confront the 
problem of technology diffusion and define policies and practices that will 
make its use possible.
One of the most important policy instruments for the promotion of 
biotechnology development deals with intellectual property rights (IPR) 
protection. Developing countries are increasingly confronted with the fact 
that a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives have been taken or are 
being implemented to “harmonize” intellectual property protection worldwide. 
“Harmonization” for most if not all countries will mean introducing much 
stricter intellectual property protection that can have far reaching consequences 
for the access to and the likelihood of broad diffusion of biotechnologies. This 
paper presents a brief analysis of the potential consequences to developing 
countries by the introduction of IPR regulations in accordance with these 
international trends.
RecentDevelopmentin  IPR ProtectionforPlantBiotechnologies
Attempts to strengthen IPR protection regimes have been underway for more 
than a decade. Initially, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
served as the main forum. A committee of experts on Biotechnology Property 
and Industrial Property was established in 1984. Efforts to develop a new 
treaty on the protection of industrial property have been on-going since 1985. 
Conventions, however, require wide approval. Industrialized countries have 
been unsuccessful in getting the higher IPR standards they would like adopted 
in other countries through WIPO (Belcher and Hawtin 1991).
Some countries, led by the U.S., have subsequently embarked on bilateral 
negotiations to secure stronger protection for the intellectual property of 
their nationals. The U.S. has used its General System of Preferences, granting 
favored-trading status only to those nations that meet rigid IPR protection 
standards. European countries have had similar commercial policy instruments 
available to deal with IPR issues.
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An extension to these bilateral actions has been the multilateral negotiation 
of trade-related intellectual property issues under GATT. Indeed, the Trade- 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement is the most 
comprehensive international instrument on intellectual property ever 
negotiated and adopted. The provisions contained in TRIPS constitute 
minimum standards. Thus, members cannot be obliged to provide a more 
extensive protection (Correa 1994).
In the area of patent rights, TRIPS contains a number of important 
provisions. According to article 27.3.b, parties may exclude from patentability:
plants and animals other than microorganisms, and essentially biological processes 
for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and micro-
biological processes. However, members shall provide for the protection of plant 
varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combi-
nation thereof. This provision shall be reviewed four years after the entry into 
force of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
This exception reflects the outstanding differences, even among industrial-
ized countries, on the patenting of plants and animals. The European Economic 
Community (EEC) proposals in GATT are aimed at maintaining the present 
position of the European countries which are members of the European Patent 
Convention. This position has so far been confirmed by the still-under-
discussion draft directive on patents relating to biotechnology.
Various elements of article 27.3.b need to be considered (Correa 1994). First, 
unlike European law and other legislation that followed the same approach, the 
article refers to “plants and animals” and not to certain classification thereof 
(varieties, races or species)'. In the absence of any distinction — and the fact 
that the second sentence of the same article introduces an exception for one 
particular classification (plant varieties) — the exclusion is to be interpreted in 
broad terms as being inclusive of animal and plants — animal races and animal 
and plant species.
Second, the reference to “essentially biological processes” is limited by the 
exclusion of “non-biological and microbiological” processes. The concept of 
microbiological processes as an exception to the exception is present in the 
European legislation and in the laws of various other countries. Its aim in the 
TRIPS context is to limit the exclusion of patentability to traditional breeding 
methods, while preserving the possibility to obtain protection. For example 
this is evident on developments based on cell manipulation or, with the
'The distinction is important. Thus, the prohibition to patent a variety does not prevent European 
countries to patent a plant, as such. The acceptance of a patent application on the “Harvard mouse” 
by the European Patent Office was, similarly, based on the judgment that it is not a “race” but a 
specifically altered animal which is patented.
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advances in biotechnology, the transfer of genes. Under the commented 
text, processes employing microorganisms (such as fermentation) are also 
patentable, in accordance with current practice in most countries.
More complex and new is the concept of “non-biological process.” How a 
plant or an animal can be produced by a process that is not totally or in part 
biological? The source and grounds of this text are untraceable. It will probably 
create more problems than it may solve.
Third, and as an exception to the general authorized exclusion, members 
must provide protection for “plant varieties” either by patents or by “an 
effective sui generis system or by a combination or both.” This obligation is 
another important basis for the expansion of the scope of intellectual property 
in a field that most developing countries keep as a part of the “public domain” 
till now. Although there is flexibility regarding the form of protection, the fact 
is that all GATT member countries will be bound to protect plant varieties.
The flexibility is here, again, a reflection of the lack of consensus among the 
industrialized countries themselves. While in the U.S. and in Japan a plant 
variety may be patentable, this is not the case in Europe. The reference to a sui 
generis system suggests the breeder’s rights regime. However, the possibility is 
open to combine the patent system with the breeders’ rights regime, or to 
develop other sui generis form of protection. It is unclear why in an instrument 
aimed at establishing universal standards, the form of protection of plant 
varieties has not been settled in a more straightforward way, like in other 
matters of equal or similar importance2. In any case, considerable freedom has 
been left for national legislation to design the system of protection in this area.
Fourth, article 27.3.b is the single provision in the whole TRIPS Agreement 
that is specifically subject to an early revision — four years after the entry-into- 
force of the Agreement. This period is even shorter than the transitional period 
contemplated for developing countries (article 65). This solution suggests how 
difficult a compromise on the biotechnology-related issues has been and the 
need for a deeper examination of the matter.
Two other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement should be mentioned here. On 
the one side — as indicated above — protection of a process is extended to the 
products directly made with said process (article 28.1.b). On the other, in civil 
proceedings relating to process patents, the reversal of the burden of proof is 
established (article 34). This principle may have a substantial impact in the 
biotechnology field, given the importance of process patents and the often 
broad claims admitted in this field.
2The UPOV (International Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties) convention is not mentioned 
in the TRIPS draft text nor are breeders rights considered a form of “intellectual property” under the 
Agreement. Another forgotten modality of protection are the utility models recognized in many 
developed and developing countries to protect “minor” inventions.
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Trends in theProtection of Plant Genetic Materials
Within this international framework, it is widely accepted that an invention 
consisting of or using living matter should be protected by IPR. With respect 
to agricultural biotechnology, the main instruments for protection are patents 
and plant breeders’ rights. Patents are available on processes used to develop 
modified organisms or to produce biological products.
Patent protection is also available in a number of countries for plants that 
contain a novel gene. Patents covering genes are not generally confined to the 
sequence of a gene. The patent typically claims first, a gene or protein, standing 
alone, corresponding to that sequence; second, a vector or plasmid incorporat-
ing the sequence; and, possibly, third, a plant (of a particular range of species) 
that has been transformed by means of such a vector (and the descendants of 
the transformed plant). Thus, the patent holder gains effective control over use 
of the specified gene in genetic engineering (Barton 1994)
In this way a broad scope for protection is granted, which raises concerns 
about the possibility of extending it to many varieties and even to entire 
species. This can certainly pose serious threats to breeding activities in 
developing countries, which have been based rather upon capacities to adapt 
existing varieties to local conditions. Moreover, scope of protection can be also 
extended to characteristics of crops, which means that the patent holder could 
claim a monopoly over any variety expressing the same trait.
Due to these concerns, uncertainty still exists about the final validity of such 
patents. But, clearly their enforcement would erect important obstacles for 
biotechnology development and diffusion mainly in developing nations.
On the other hand, Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBR) are granted by governments 
to plant breeders to exclude others from producing or commercializing material 
of a specific plant variety for, minimally, 15 to 20 years. In order to be eligible 
for PBR, the variety must be novel, distinct from existing varieties, and uniform 
and stable in its essential characteristics.
The legislation for both patents and PBR contains provisions for limited 
unauthorized use of the protected matter. Patent legislation includes a research 
exemption that allows others to study the protected subject matter without 
reproducing or multiplying it for commercial purposes. PBR law has important 
limits designed to facilitate continued improvement of protected varieties. 
Under the so-called Breeders’ Exemption, any protected plant variety can be 
freely used as plant genetic resource for the purpose of breeding other varieties. 
Another important feature of PBR is a provision that allows farmers to re-use in 
their own exploitation the seeds they have obtained, a possibility that patents 
would exclude.
Demands exist to strengthen the minimum standards for protection of PBR 
under the International Union for the Protection of Plant Varieties (UPOV).
The main change introduced by the 1991 conference included the exclusion 
of the farmer’s privilege. The change also allowed member countries to adopt 
such provision while allowing the right-holder to prevent such a use on the
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grounds that its legitimate interest will be prejudiced. Another important 
provision is made to prevent the unauthorized exploitation of any variety that 
is considered to be “essentially derived” from a protected variety. (A variety 
is considered essentially derived for this purpose when it is derived from 
the protected variety and retains virtually the entire genetic structure of the 
protected variety.) In this regard, the revised convention may contribute to 
dissipating some of the breeders’ fears on the eventual impact of the patenting 
genes that may be incorporated in their protected varieties.
In summary, these new provisions respond to industry’s claims for a 
protection more similar to that conferred under the patent system. Again, 
these new provisions are meant to protect interests of multinational seed 
companies and seem to erect new barriers for developing countries’ access 
to agricultural biotechnologies.
ExpectedEffectsofStrongerIPR Protection
As mentioned before, the new international framework for the protection 
of biotechnologies under IPR has brought some of peace in mind to those 
who had pressured for change. In a situation where strong IPR protection 
has been established, foreign biotechnology companies can be expected to 
be more interested in exporting their modem products, plant varieties and 
technologies to the country in question. The new framework could also be 
expected to produce an increase in private research activity, thanks to the 
economic incentive of the possibility of having a temporary monopoly posi-
tion granted by different IPR mechanisms. International Property Rights 
protection can also facilitate the rapid availability of technology and foreign 
modern varieties, via licensing agreements and other contractual agreements 
(DG1S 1991).
On the other hand, extension of patent protection to all subsequent genera-
tions of a patented living organism by broad claims or stronger PBR protection 
through the “essentially derived” principle will increase production costs for 
breeders and may also lead to a control over segments of cultivated crops by 
IPR holders. This will pose severe difficulties for most plant breeders and small 
farmers of developing countries to access the benefits of new agricultural 
biotechnologies.
Unfortunately, in most developing countries, lack of a competitive market, 
limited research facilities and lack of participation of private companies in 
innovative activities represent serious obstacles to capitalize the benefits of a 
modern system of IPR protection. Despite the evident progress made by many 
developing countries to adapt their regulations to TRIPS, it still will be difficult 
to enforce them. Most countries lack the institutions and personnel for safe-
guarding IPR. Under present conditions, with a weak innovation system, such 
protection will mainly benefit large foreign firms wanting to protect an export 
monopoly and not necessarily interested in manufacturing their biotechnology 
products in these countries.
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If innovation is to be encouraged, IPR protection is an important mechanism. 
But, it will not work in isolation. New regulations must be conceived within 
the framework of a national innovation system. This links research, technology 
development and diffusion as a continuous, interactive process in which local 
scientific and technological effort is crucial (Brenner and Komen 1994).
Figure 1 presents a simplified scheme of a system in which biotechnology 
and its regulatory framework should be integrated.
FIGURE 1
__________BIOTECHNOLOGY IN A NATIONAL SYSTEM OF INNOVATION_____________
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ACTORS AND INSTITUTIONS
© OECD, 1994, International Initiatives in Biotechnology for Developing Country Agriculture: 
Promises and Problems. Reproduced by permission of the OECD.
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Implementation of an innovation-system approach is not only a question of 
increasing investments in R&D in order to have greater capacity for scientific 
research. It is also critical to facilitate the adaptation and assimilation of 
biotechnology developed in other countries. Protection of IPR will then play 
an important role creating a safe climate for technology transfer. But it has 
to be integrated to a new biotechnology strategy that should involve closer 
relationships between science, technology and the market for fostering 
innovations and their dissemination.
This process for formulating strategies and policies should follow a certain 
logical order so that the main actors of biotechnology development become 
committed to certain common objectives and obstacles to technology diffusion 
can be removed. Thus, the first thing is establishing long-term objectives and 
priorities, a necessity for making strategic decisions. The second step would 
involve establishing coherent programs for strengthening the institutional and 
managerial framework to address these priorities. Sound policy instruments are 
needed to ensure that researchers, enterprises, Non-Government Organizations 
and farmers participate in priority projects for introducing biotechnology. 
Finally, implementation requires continuous monitoring and assessment of 
achievements and obstacles to maintain quality of technical aspects. Implemen-
tation must also include an awareness of the socioeconomic impacts on the 
introduction of biotechnologies, and make timely corrective actions for 
attaining general objectives.
1 3 0 Genes for the Future: Discovery, Ownership, Access
